Governmental Immunity from Zoning by Adelfio, Marco
Boston College Law Review
Volume 22
Issue 4 Symposium On The Crude Oil Windfall Profit
Tax Act Of 1980
Article 4
5-1-1981
Governmental Immunity from Zoning
Marco Adelfio
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Land Use Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marco Adelfio, Governmental Immunity from Zoning, 22 B.C.L. Rev. 783 (1981),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol22/iss4/4
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FROM ZONING
The power of a state agency or subdivision to utilize and develop land that
is within the boundaries of a local government unit frequently conflicts with the
local government's power to restrict the use of land through zoning.' To grant
immunity from zoning' to the intruding government' may result in irreparable
harm4 to the otherwise consistent land-use plan of the host government.' Alter-
natively, to deny such immunity may result in drastic consequences 6 for the in-
truding government's own development plans.
In the typical controversy, a state agency or governmental subdivision at-
tempts to use or develop land that has been zoned by a local government entity,
such as a municipality. If the proposed use is prohibited under the zoning or-
dinances, the intruding government may petition the zoning board for a
variance or special exception,' but often the intruding entity claims it is im-
' 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 2d, 5 12.02, at 397 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as ANDERSON]. There are also cases in which a governmental unit claims immunity from its
own zoning ordinances. See, e.g., McGrath v. City of Manchester, 113 N.H. 355, 307 A.2d 830
(1973); Nehrbas v. Incorporated Village of Lloyd Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 140 N.E.2d 241, 159
N.Y.S.2d 145 (1947). Violation of one's own zoning ordinances is far less onerous than violation
of another community's zoning ordinances and is analogous to a de facto variance. Orange
County v. City of Apopka, 299 So. 2d 652, 654 (Fla. App. 1974). The law applicable in cases in-
volving immunity from a municipality's own zoning ordinances is substantially similar to the law
applicable in cases involving immunity from a foreign government unit's ordinances. See 8 E.
MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 5 25.15, at 37 (3d ed. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as MCQUILLIN].
2 Although many similar principles arise in a consideration of immunity from building
codes and regulations, this note will focus only on zoning ordinances. For a recent decision ad-
dressing governmental immunity from building codes, see State v. City of Kansas City, 228 Kan.
25, 612 P.2d 578 (1980).
3 As used in this note, "intruding government" means any state agency or political
subdivision desiring to use land which is within the jurisdictional boundary of a local government
entity. "Host government" refers to the local government entity — a municipality, township or
county — which has enacted zoning ordinances covering the subject property. These terms are
intended to be interpreted in a neutral, non-prejudicial manner.
' See, e.g., Kedroff v. Town of Springfield, 127 Vt. 624, 256 A.2d 457 (1969) (sewage
treatment plant permitted in residential district).
For the definition of "host government" as used in this note, see note 3 supra.
6 See, e.g. , Baltis v. Village of Westchester, 3 III. 2d 388, 121 N.E.2d 495 (1954) (water
tower and underground water storage tank prohibited in residential district).
Most states allow any party desiring to use land in a manner violative of applicable
zoning ordinances to petition an administrative board for relief from strict enforcement of the
zoning ordinances to that party, in the form of a special use permit or variance. 3 ANDERSON,
supra note 1, S 18.01, at 136. A variance is a decision by a zoning board not to enforce the or-
dinance against the applicant because of a finding that a hardship exists. Id. 5 18.02, at 137. A
special use permit is a deviation allowed on the condition that certain criteria are present, "e.g.,
substantial public service and convenience from the use and absence of danger or annoyance to
nearby property owners or residents." See 8 MCQUILLIN, supra note I, 5 25.160, at 476.
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mune from zoning restrictions and the controversy reaches the courts without
passing through an administrative proceeding.° The issue of immunity arises
in the courts when the host government sues for an injunction° or the intruding
government sues for a decree that it is immune from local zoning by virtue of
its status as a governmental body.'° The immunity that is asserted is the power
to make land-use decisions without regard to local zoning.
The parties' competing powers to zone and to develop land typically are
derived from state enabling acts." The legislature could state in the enabling
statutes whether immunity should result and under what conditions.' 2 Most
enabling acts, however, lack such a statement, and thus leave the controversy
to be resolved by the courts.' 3
 Where the enabling acts are silent, the courts
have traditionally applied three tests to resolve the controversy: the eminent
domain test," the superior sovereignty test,' 5 and the governmental-
proprietary test. ' 6
 These tests provide that an intruding government that has
the power of eminent domain, or is higher in the governmental hierarchy, or is
exercising a governmental function, is granted judicial immunity from zoning
ordinances unless there is an express legislative directive to the contrary."
Some courts justify the result on the basis of an inference of legislative intent
8 See, e.g., County Comm 'rs of Bristol v. Conservation Comm'n of Dartmouth, 1980
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1289, 1291, 405 N.E.2d 637, 638. Several recent decisions have required the in-
truding government entity to submit to the decisionmaking authority of the local zoning board.
See text at note 163 infra.
See, e.g., City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 322
So, 2d 571, 573 (Fla. App. 1975), aff'd, 332 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1976).
'° See, e.g., Orange County v. City of Apopka, 299 So. 2d 652, 653 (Fla. App. 1974).
" See 8 MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, .5 25.48 and 10 id. 5 28.02, at 4-5. Zoning is an ele-
ment of the state police power, which is the broad power to act to protect the public health, safety
and welfare. 1 ANDERSON, supra note 1, 5 2.02, at 29-30. The authority exists solely in the state
unless delegated to a local subdivision by a legislative enabling act or by a constitutional home
rule provision. See id. 55 2.15, 2.16; 8 McQuiLLIN, supra note 1, 5 25.06, at 19.
12 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE 53091 (West Supp. 1980), which provides: "this sec-
tion does. not require a school district to comply with the zoning ordinances of a county or city
unless such zoning ordinances make provision for the location of public schools and unless the
city or county planning commission has adopted a master plan."
" Perhaps one reason for the legislature's usual silence on this issue is that the political
ramifications of state usurpation of local autonomous decisionmaking powers or of explicit local
restrictions on the power of state agencies may be severe. It is also possible that the legislature
fails to consider the possibility of a conflict or assumes that it does not need to direct judicial
resolution of this controversy.
1+ See, e.g., State ex rd. Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 1960); Seward County
Bd. of Comm'rs v. City of Seward, 196 Neb. 266, 242 N.W.2d 849 (1976); South Hill Sewer
Dist. v. Pierce County, 22 Wash. App. 738, 591 P.2d 877 (1979).
" See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, 212 Cal. App. 2d 160, 28
Cal, Rptr. 32 (1963); Mayor of Baltimore v. State, 281 Md. 217, 378 A.2d 1326 (1977); Ap-
pelbaum v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1970).
18 See, e.g., County Comm'rs of Bristol v. Conservation Comm'n of Dartmouth, 1980
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1289, 405 N.E.2d 637; Nehrbas v. Incorporated Village of Lloyd Harbor, 2
N.Y.2d 190, 140 N.E.2d 241, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1957). Accord, New Orleans v. State, 364 So.
2d 1020 (La. 1978).
" See, e.g., Russell v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Brookline, 349 Mass. 532, 209 N.E.2d
337 (1965).
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underlying the enabling act of the intruding government." Other courts,
rather than inferring legislative intent, have relied on their common law
powers to hold that immunity results directly from the presence of the above
mentioned factors." The general rule that emerges from the application of the
traditional tests is that government entities are immune from zoning or-
dinances."
Judicial dissatisfaction with these traditional single-factor tests, and
changes in both governmental policy 2 ' and the nature of state governmental
have prompted several courts to vary them." Ultimately, courts in a growing
number of jurisdictions have taken the further step of abandoning the old tests
in favor of an interest balancing approach that examines the equities of the par
titular factual situation. 24 Three different tests have developed. The first balanc-
ing of interests test applies a two-tiered analysis." Courts adopting this ap-
proach first decide whether the legislature intended to grant immunity, 26 infer-
ring the legislative intent of the enabling acts from a weighing of the competing
interests of the parties. 27 If immunity is granted, these courts then examine the
reasonableness of the proposed land-use." The second balancing of interests
approach denies an intruding government unit the opportunity to assert im-
munity. 29 These courts allow only an assertion that a zoning board's prohibi-
'" See, e.g., City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. of Greater Chicago, 48
Ill. 2d 11, 268 N.E.2d 428 (1971).
19 See, e.g., Nehrbas v. Incorporated Village of Lloyd Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 193, 140
N.E.2d 241, 242, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145, 147 (1957).
20 Comment, Balancing Interests to Determine Governmental Exemption from Zoning Laws, 1973
U. ILL. L. F. 125, 125. See also cases cited at notes 14-16 supra.
Si See, e.g., Town of Oronoco v. City of Rochester, 293 Minn. 468, 197 N.W.2d 426
(1972). The court rejected the traditional tests "because the pungent realities of urban sprawl
and overpopulation have accentuated the need for land-use planning and control that serves as
foundation for the exercise of police power in the area of zoning." Id. at 471, 197 N.W.2d at 429.
72 See, e.g., In re Suntide Inn Motel, 563 P.2d 125 (Okla. 1977). The dissenting justice
criticized the application of the traditional tests to increasingly decentralized state governments.
"There were, at last official count, 235 state boards, agencies and commissions. It is unrealistic
to assume that all 'state' demands upon municipal land which these agencies could potentially
make, would be for equally important public purposes or that their site selections would always
be reasonable." Id. at 132 (footnote omitted).
23 See, e.g., Conners v. New York State Ass'n of Retarded Children, Inc., 82 Misc. 2d
861, 370 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1975) (ln New York, an intruding government that is granted immunity
on the basis of the governmental-proprietary test must act reasonably and rationally and is not
free to make arbitrary site selections. Id. at 864, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 477); Porter v. Southwestern
Public Serv. Co., 489 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). (In Texas, courts will not grant im-
munity on the basis of the eminent domain test if the intruding government entity acquired the
property with notice of the zoning ordinances. Id, at 364-65).
24 See cases cited in notes 25 & 30 infra.
25 See, e.g., Rutgers, State Univ. v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 152-53, 286 A.2d 697, 702-03
(1972).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 153-54, 286 A.2d at 703.
29 See, e.g., City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 322
So. 2d 571, 579 (Fla. App. 1975), aff'd, 332 So. 2d 610, 613 (Fla. 1976); Lincoln County v.
Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 453, 457 (S.D. 1977).
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tion of a proposed use is unreasonable because of an overriding public interest
sought to be promoted by the proposed use. 3 ° The third balancing approach
also adopts a two-tiered analysis. 3 ' Under this test, immunity and
reasonableness are decided separately by the court. 32
 Immunity is decided sole-
ly by balancing the parties' competing interests on an ad hoc basis. 33
Reasonableness is then decided by examining whether the initial land use deci-
sion is "unreasonable, arbitrary, or discriminatory. "34
 In contrast to the com-
mon outcome of the traditional tests, applications of the three interest balanc-
ing approaches often result in an intruding government being held subject to
local zoning ordinances."
While it is evident that courts are increasingly willing to adopt the alter-
native balancing of interests analysis, the traditional tests retain their vitality
in a majority of jurisdictions." This note will examine both the traditional sole-
factor tests and the alternative balancing of interests tests. It will present first
the three traditional tests, analyzing both the primary supporting rationales
and the recent court criticisms of each test. The alternative tests will then be ex-
amined. The note will conclude with an analysis of several salient features of
the new tests, and proposals for modifications of these features, in an effort to
determine which features are most appropriate for the resolution of this recur-
ring land-use controversy. It is submitted that the traditional sole-factor tests
are inappropriate for resolving intergovernmental immunity controversies and
should be abandoned in favor of the third balancing of interests test, which
balances specific competing interests in deciding the issues of immunity and
reasonableness. Not even this balancing of interests test, however, considers all
of the factors relevant to maximizing the public benefit. Therefore, modifica-
tions of this test will be proposed in an effort to propose a test that will include
all relevant factors.
I. TRADITIONAL TESTS
The majority of jurisdictions continue to apply one or more of the three
traditional tests: the eminent domain test, the superior sovereignty test, and
the governmental-proprietary test. Several recurrent criticisms of these tests,
" See, e.g., City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 322
So. 2d 571, 576 (Fla. App. 1975), aff'd, 332 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1976); Lincoln County v. Johnson,
257 N.W.2d 453, 458 (S.D. 1977).
3 ' See, e.g., City of Fargo v. Harwood Twp., 256 N.W.2d 694, 698-700 (N.D. 1977).
32 Id.
" Id, at 698-99.
34 Id. at 700.
35 See, e.g., Pal-Mar Water Management Dist. v. Martin County, 377 So. 2d 752 (Fla.
App. 1979); Brown v. Kansas Forestry, Fish & Game Comm'n, 2 Kan. App. 2d 102, 576 P.2d
230 (1978); City of Fargo v. Harwood Twp., 256 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1977).
" Johnston, Recent Cases in the Law on Intergovermental Zoning Immunity: New Standards
Designed to Maximize the Public Interests, 8 URB. LAWYER 327, 328 (1976). At this writing, only
Delaware, Florida, Kansas, North Dakota, New Jersey, Ohio and South Dakota have aban-
doned the traditional tests in favor of a balancing of interests approach.
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however, have recently been expressed by courts and commentators." This
section will examine each of the tests, concentrating on the courts' various ra-
tionales for adopting and retaining them and on the criticisms expressed by the
courts that have modified or abandoned them. Following this examination, this
section will analyze the tests in light of specific policy objectives that are
defeated by a judicial grant of zoning immunity.
A. Eminent Domain Test
The power of eminent domain is the sovereign's right to "condemn"
private land for a public use without the owner's consent. 38 Numerous courts
consider a delegation of eminent domain powers to the intruding government
to be sufficient justification for a grant of immunity from zoning. 39 The only
issue is whether the power to condemn is present; the issue of whether the sub-
ject property was actually taken through condemnation or purchased is irrele-
vant.'" These courts deem the condemnation power superior to the zoning
power, finding that "[elminent domain is an inherent and necessary attribute
of sovereignty, existing independently of constitutional provisions and superior
to all property rights. " 41 The courts applying this test infer a legislative intent
that the power of eminent domain not be restricted by the zoning power. 42 One
court has noted, for example, that to subordinate the exercise of eminent do-
main to zoning ordinances would relegate the authority of the intruding
government to that of a private landholder thus frustrating the purpose of the
statute that gave it its condemnation power. 43 By virtue of their eminent do-
main powers, therefore, intruding government units are deemed inherently
superior to entities exercising the power to zone.
There are three recurrent criticisms of the eminent domain test. First,
several courts have commented that the conflict between the powers is illusory.
Second, courts have criticized the assumption that the party possessing the
right to condemn is inherently superior. Finally, one court has rejected the
claim that municipal restrictions on the power of eminent domain, which is ex-
" Note, Governmental Immunity from Local Zoning Ordinances, 84 HARV. L. REV, 869,
869-79 (1971); Comment, Balancing Interests to Determine Governmental Exemption from Zoning Laws,
1973 U. ILL. L. F. 125, 125-36; ,Johnston, Recent Cases in the Law on Intergovernmental Zoning Im-
munity: New Standards Designed to Maximize the Public Interests, 8 URIC. LAWYER 327, 331-35 (1976).
" 1 NICHOLS, P., THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 1.11 (3d ed. rev. 1980).
" See cases cited at note 14 supra.
4° City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court of Tempe, 90 Ariz. 393, 398-99, 368 P.2d 637,
640 (1962); Evans v. ,Just Open Gov't, 242 Ga. 834, 837, 251 S.E.2d 546, 549 (1979).
" State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 37 Ohio Ops. 58, 61, 79 N.E.2d
698, 704 (1947) (quoting 29 C.J. Eminent Domain $ 2 (1947)).
42 See, e.g., Seward County Bd. of Comm'rs v. City of Seward, 196 Neb. 266, 274, 242
N.W.2d 849, 854 (1976); South Hill Sewer Dist. v. Pierce County, 22 Wash. App. 738, 742-43,
591 P.2d 877, 880 (1979).
" City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 48 Ill. 2d 11, 14, 268 N.E.2d 428,
430 (1971).
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ercised in the public interest, are against public policy, since municipal restric-
tions also serve a public interest.
First, several courts have focused on the attributes of zoning and condem-
nation powers and concluded that the conflict between the powers is illusory."
These courts reason that, since zoning ordinances usually have no impact on
the exercise of the right of eminent domain, full effect can be given to both
powers. 45
 In reaching this position, some courts have reasoned that zoning or-
dinances restrict only the right to use land, not the right to acquire it. "
 Since
eminent domain only empowers the intruding government to acquire land and
does not enhance its right to use land, there is no real conflict between the
powers. 47 It has also been noted that the right to select a specific site for a par-
ticular purpose is not necessarily included in the power of eminent domain."
Unless the zoning plan of a locality entirely prohibits a particular activity, the
plan's only effect on the development plans of the intruding government is to
delimit the selection of a specific site. 49 Therefore, effect can be given both the
zoning power and the condemnation power." Since the power to use land and
the power to select a specific site are not components of eminent domain, the
power to condemn is riot curtailed by requiring that it be exercised in com-
pliance with zoning ordinances."
The second recurrent criticism of the eminent domain test is directed at
the premise that eminent domain is intrinsically superior to zoning. It is argued
that an inference of legislative intent that immunity be accorded the grantee of
the power of eminent domain is unwarranted, since the nature and source of
44
 Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1980).
45 Id. at 285, 407 N.E.2d at 1367. The court rejected the eminent domain test on the
ground that:
while [the notion that zoning ordinances may completely frustrate attempts to ex-
ercise the power of eminent domain] is a legitimate concern, it does not justify the
invocation of absolute immunity in all cases. Unless a municipality completely
prohibits a certain use within its corporate limits, the state may acquire property
for that use and still comply with local zoning restrictions.
Id.
46
 West v. Housing Auth. of Atlanta, 211 Ga. 133, 84 S.E.2d 30 (1954). In holding that
zoning ordinances do not prevent the acquisition of property, the court reasoned that compliance
with zoning ordinances is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of eminent do-
main. The court further noted that condemnation is merely a "preparatory step" to use, which
use may or may not be subject to zoning. Id. at 135, 84 S.E.2d at 32-33.
47
 Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 332 So. 2d 571, 578
(Fla. App. 1975).
48 St. Louis County v. City of Manchester, 360 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. 1962). The court
noted that the general enabling acts authorizing the city to condemn land for a sewage disposal
plant "do not purport to give the city the right to select the exact location in St. Louis County. "-
Id. at 642.
49 City of Fargo v. Harwood Twp., 256 N.W.2d 694, 698 (N.D. 1977). The court
observed that "I rleasonable zoning ordinances limit, but do not eliminate, a governmental unit's
power to locate its facilities through its eminent domain power." (quoting Note, Governmental Im-
munity from Local Zoning Ordinances, 84 HARV. L. REV. 869, 875 (1971)).
5° St. Louis County, 360 S.W.2d at 642.
" See note 45 supra.
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eminent domain and zoning powers are substantially similar. 52 Zoning is at-
tributable to the police power, which is the inherent power of the sovereign to
protect the public health, safety and welfare. 53 Since both eminent domain and
zoning are inherent attributes of sovereignty, there appears to be no valid
justification for subordinating zoning powers to condemnation powers."
Moreover, several courts have noted that an intruding government entity,
whether it is a state agency or a political subdivision, has no right to condemn
unless the legislature delegates the power to it. 55 A claim that eminent domain
is superior because it is an inherent power, therefore, is deemed
unconvincing. 56
Finally, the Supreme Court of Ohio has expressly distinguished between
private restrictions on land-use and zoning ordinances. In a case involving
private restrictive covenants, 57 the court held that immunity was warranted for
a condemning government entity because an attempt by a private party to in-
fringe on the right of eminent domain, which "rests upon public necessity, ..
is clearly against public policy and is therefore illegal and void. "88 In a recent
case involving zoning ordinances, 59 however, the court refused to extend im-
munity to a condemning intruding government. 60 The court reasoned that the
rationale with respect to private restrictive covenants did not apply because
"(both the municipality's exercise of its zoning powers and the state's exercise
of the power of eminent domain are intended to effectuate public purposes. "51
In view of the relatively equal interests sought to be promoted by the exercise of
each power, eminent domain was rejected as a justification for granting im-
munity. 52
" Porter v. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 489 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). The
court restricted the eminent domain test on the following rationale:
Eminent domain involves the deprivation of the right of the property owner to
keep his property when it is needed for public use. Zoning regulations, derived
from the police powers, deprive the property owner of the use of his property con-
trary to standards promulgated for the health, safety and welfare of the public
generally. Both powers are inherent in state government and may be delegated for
appropriate purposes. Neither power is an unbridled one; in short, there must not
be an abuse of the power.
Id. at 363.
55 See note 11 supra.
" See note 52 supra.
" City of Fargo v. Harwood Twp., 256 N.W.2d 694, 697 (N.D. 1977) (citing with ap-
proval City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court of Tempe, 90 Ariz. 393, 400-01, 368 P.2d 637,
641-42 (1962) (dissenting opinion)).
56 256 N.W.2d at 697.
" Doan v. Cleveland Short Line Ry. Co., 92 Ohio St. 461, 112 N.E. 505 (1915).
58 Id. at 468-69, 112 N.E. at 507.
59 Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 407 N.E.2d 1365 (1980).
6° Id. at 285, 407 N.E.2d at 1367.
61. Id.
62 Id. The court instead adopted an alternative test wherein it sought "to weigh the
general public purposes to be served by the exercise of each power, and to resolve the impasse in
favor of that power which will serve the needs of the greater number of our citizens." Id.
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B. Superior-Sovereignty Test
Courts applying the second traditional test grant immunity in all cases
where the intruding government is deemed superior to the host government. 63
A comparison of each party's position in the governmental hierarchy is usually
determinative." Therefore, the state and its agencies with statewide jurisdic-
tion are immune from local zoning authority unless the state has expressly sub-
jected itself to local ordinances. 65 Some courts justify the grant of immunity on
the theory that any derogation of sovereign powers must be explicit. 66 Others
reason that a local government should not be permitted to use its zoning to
"thwart the state from performing its duty." 67
Critics of this superior-sovereignty test have generally acknowledged the
importance of benefiting the greater number of citizens, 68 but have disagreed
with the proposition that a hierarchical ranking should be determinative- 69
Critics have focused on the practical difficulties of ascertaining a meaningful
hierarchical ranking. 7° Ranking of government entities has been inconsistent
among the states!" In addition, in many states, municipalities derive their zon-
ing powers directly from a home-rule provision in the state constitution rather
than through legislation. 72 That the power to zone emanates from a superior
source weakens the premise that a municipality should not be allowed to use its
zoning power to thwart a state function. 73 Moreover, in non-home-rule states,
zoning is an element of the statewide police power delegated by statute to state
subdivisions. 74
 In enacting zoning ordinances, the grantee of the power acts in
63 See cases cited at note 15 supra.
64 Aviation Serv. v. Board of Adjustment of Hanover, 20 N.J. 275, 119 A.2d 761
(1956). The court, in dictum, enunciated the general principle of the superior sovereignty test as
follows: "where the immunity from local zoning regulation is claimed by any agency or authority
which occupies a superior position in the governmental hierarchy, the presumption is that such
immunity was intended in the absence of express statutory language to the contrary." Id. at 282,
119 A.2d at 765.
65 See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. State, 281 Md. 217, 223, 378 A.2d 1326, 1329
(1977).
66 See, e.g., Union Bldg. & Constr. Corp. v. Borough of Totowa, 98 N.J. Super. 446,
449, 237 A.2d 637, 638 (1968).
67
 Kunimoto v. Kawakami, 56 Hawaii 582, 585, 545 P.2d 684, 686 (1976).
68 Rutgers, State Univ. v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 153, 286 A.2d 697, 702 (1972).
69 Id. at 153, 286 A.2d at 703.
" Comment, Balancing Interests to Determine Governmental Exemption from Zoning Laws, 1973
U. ILL. L. R. 125, 128.
Compare City of Richmond v. Board of Supervisors, 199 Va. 679, 101 S.E.2d 641
(1958) (In Virginia, counties and cities are both "coequal political subdivision[s] and agenclies]
of the State." Id. at 684, 101 S.E.2d at 644); with County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles,
212 Cal. App. 2d 160, 28 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1963) (In California, despite a constitutional grant of
home rule power to a city, the county is the superior sovereign. Id. at 164.65, 28 Cal. Rptr. at
24-35).
" Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 322 So. 2d 571, 576-77
(Fla. App. 1975).
73 Id.
74 See note 11 supra.
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its capacity as a state agency." Hence, critics assert that zoning ordinances
should not be annulled as against a party with a statewide jurisdiction merely
because the zoning power is exercised by a local subdivision. 76 Finally, the ap-
plicability of the test is limited, since it clearly offers no guidance to courts con-
fronted with opposing parties of equal sovereignty, such as neighboring
municipalities.
The practical difficulty of ranking state agencies is not the only criticism of
the test voiced by recent court decisions. A second focus of criticism is that,
even if governmental units can be ranked according to their position on the
governmental hierarchy, there is no guarantee that the entity representing the
broader constituency also represents the greater social utility." For example,
the Court of Appeals of Kansas recently decided a case involving the state
recreational commissioner's attempt to construct an all-night parking lot and
rest room facility in a county residential district." The court recognized that,
despite the intruding government entity's statewide jurisdiction and respon-
sibility, the segment of the population that would be served by the proposed
project was "relatively small," 79 and the social utility of the proposed project
was "marginal."" Other state agencies, however, clearly benefit all of the
citizens of a state for a function that is of paramount importance. A common
example of the latter is a state agency charged with the development of a state
" See, e.g. , In re Suntide Inn Motel, 563 P.2d 125 (Okla. 1977). The dissenting justices
argued:
it is important to understand that this conflict is not simply between a city and a
state agency attempting to excercise a sovereign power. The Legislature has
specifically empowered cities to enact and enforce zoning regulations. . . . This
zoning power is also a sovereign power, and in their exercise thereof, cities are
`equally agents of the state.'
Id. at 131 (citations omitted).
" City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 468 Pa. 174, 360 A.2d 607 (1976). In rejecting
the superior sovereignty test, the court commented:
Resolving the conflict simply by saying that the 'state' agency must prevail
because it is exercising the power of the sovereign overlooks that the zoning power
the city seeks to exercise is also a sovereign power. Such a resolution ignores the
interests the state seeks to promote by legislative grants of powers to
municipalities. Interests such as those fostered by comprehensive land use plan-
ning statutes are too important not to be recognized as involving exercises of state
power.
Id. at 180, 360 A.2d at 610.
" Brown v. Kansas Forestry Fish & Game Comin'n, 2 Kan. App. 2d 102, 	 576
P.2d 230, 236 (1978) (citing with approval In re Suntide Inn Motel, 563 P.2d 125 (Okla. 1977)
(dissenting opinion), where the judge criticized the majority's reliance on the superior sovereign-
ty test, noting that: "(iit is unrealistic to assume that all 'state' demands upon municipal land
which these state agencies could potentially make would be for equally important public pur-
poses. . . ." Id. at 132).
" Brown v. Kansas Forestry, Fish & Game Comm'n, 2 Kan. App. 2d 102, 576 P.2d
230 (1978).
79 Id. at 114, 576, P.2d at 238.
" Id.
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university. 8 ' Though the superior-sovereignty test fails to recognize the distinc-
tion between the two factual settings presented above, many jurisdictions have
not abandoned the test." The trend is to examine the issue of sovereignty in
the context of other criteria relevant to resolving the controversy."
C. Governmental-Proprietary Test
Courts employing the governmental-proprietary test grant immunity to
any intruding government for any proposed activity that is in furtherance of a
governmental, as opposed to proprietary, function." To distinguish between a
governmental function and proprietary function, some courts draw on a test
that originated in tort law." The test based on the tort distinction defines a
governmental function as one that is directed toward effectuating public policy
and a proprietary function as one that is similar to that of a profit-making cor-
poration. 66
 Another group of courts applies a different distinction. They dif-
ferentiate between activities that are mandated by the legislature, or by societal
conditions, and activities that are permissive." For the first group of courts,
which distinguishes between public and private activities, a municipality acting
in its governmental capacity acts as an arm of the state and thus shares the
sovereign immunity of the state, whereas a municipality acting in a proprietary
capacity is liable for its torts to the same extent as a private corporation." The
courts that distinguish between mandatory and permissive activities reason
that to subject a mandatory activity to local zoning control would frustrate the
legislative mandate" or would prevent the achievement of the important
societal goal that renders the activity mandatory." Each definition leaves some
discretion to the courts to characterize activities as governmental or pro-
prietary.
" See, e.g. , Rutgers, State Univ. v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 153, 286 A.2d 697, 703 (1972)
(state university benefits all citizens of state; social utility is great).
82 See, e.g., Lincoln County v. Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 453, 457 (S.D. 1977) (reserving
the issue of the acceptability of the superior sovereign test to an appropriate case).
85 See, e.g. , Rutgers, State Univ. v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 153, 286 A.2d 697, 702-03
(1972) (holding that the "nature and scope of the instrumentality seeking review" is one of many
factors to be considered by the court).
84
 See cases cited at note 16 supra.
85 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 131 at 979-82 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
88 See, e,g., Town of Bloomfield v. New Jersey Highway Auth., 18 N.J. 237, 245-46,
113 A.2d 658, 662 (1955); Water Works Ed. of Birmingham v. Stephens, 262 Ala. 203, 209, 78
So. 2d 267, 272 (1955).
82 See, e.g., Canners v. New York State Ass'n of Retarded Children, 82 Misc. 2d 861,
864, 370 N.Y.S.2d 474, 477 (1975); Village on the Hill, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Auth.,
348 Mass. 107, 118, 202 N.E.2d 602, 610-11 (1964).
88
 PROSSER at 977-78.
88 See, e.g., Nowack v. Department of Audit and Control, 72 Misc. 2d 518, 519-20, 338
N.Y.S.2d 52, 54 (1973).
" See, e.g., Nehrbas v. Incorporated Village of Lloyd Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 193,
194-95, 140 N.E.2d 241, 242, 243, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145, 147, 148-49 (1957).
May 19811	 GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY	 793
There are three general areas of criticism of the governmental-proprietary
test. First, in practice the classifications under both tests have proven inconsist-
ent and unpredictable. 9 ' Second, the test based on the traditional tort distinc-
tion has been deemed to have been unjustifiably appropriated from the tort
field." Finally, several courts have criticized the test that is based on a desire
not to frustrate a legislative or societal mandate on the ground that the man-
date is not frustrated except in the situation where the zoning ordinances pro-
hibit entirely the proposed use."
The first general criticism of the governmental-proprietary distinction is
directed at the lack of consistency that has characterized judicial
classifications." Activities that have been held proprietary in one state have
been held governmental in others, 95 and classifications have changed over
time. 96 In one state, for example, sewage disposal was held governmental for
the purpose of tort liability but proprietary for the purpose of zoning
immunity." As a result of such confusion, one court declared the govern-
mental-proprietary distinction to be illusory, noting that all activities of a
government are essentially governmenta.1. 98
The second criticism focuses on the propriety of applying a concept that
originated as a device for limiting sovereign immunity in tort to intergovern-
mental zoning controversies. 99 The distinction originated in the tort field in
response to public policy determinations that government immunity should be
9 ' See, e.g., Lincoln County v. Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 453, 457 (S.D. 1977).
" See, e.g., O'Connor v. City of Rockford, 3 Ill. App. 3d 548, 551, 279 N.E.2d 356, 359
(1972), rev'd on other grounds, 52 111. 2d 360, 288 N.E.2d 432 (1972).
93 City of Richmond v. Board of Supervisors, 199 Va. 679, 686, 101 S.E.2d 641, 646
(1958).
94 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955). Accord, Lincoln County
v. Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 453, 457 (S.D. 1977) (rejecting the criterion because of the inconsisten-
cies of application); Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1980)
(rejecting the distinction because of its difficulty of application). See generally 2 ANDERSON, supra
note 1, 12.03 at 398-99. The great difficulty lies in determining which functions are govern-
mental, and which are proprietary. The distinction is of ancient vintage, but it is neither clear
nor stable. . . . The only dependable criteria are those found in the local zoning cases of recent
vintage." Id. (footnotes omitted).
95 Compare County of Westchester v. Village of Mamaroneck, 22 A.D.2d 143, 146, 255
N.Y.S.2d 290, 292 (1964) aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 940, 212 N.E.2d 442, 264 N1Y.S.2d 925 (1965)
(sewage disposal plant governmental) with Jefferson County v. City of Birmingham, 256 Ala.
436, 441, 55 So. 2d 196, 200 (1951) (sewage disposal plant proprietary for zoning controversy).
96 Compare Nehrbas v. Incorporated Village of Lloyd Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 194-95,
140 N.E.2d 241, 243, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145, 148-49 (1957) (garbage collection and disposal govern-
mental) with O'Brien v. Town of Greenburgh, 239 A.D. 555, 559-60, 268 N.Y.S. 173, 178-79
(1933), aff'd, 266 N.Y. 582, 195 N.E. 210 (1935) (garbage collection and disposal proprietary).
97 Jefferson County v. City of Birmingham, 256 Ala. 436, 441, 55 So. 2d 196, 200
(1951) (sewage disposal plant - governmental for tort liability; proprietary for zoning contro-
versy).
98 Lincoln County v. Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 453, 457 (S.D. 1977) (citing Township of
Washington v. Village of Ridgewood, 26 N.J. 578, 584, 141 A.2d 308, 311 (1958)).
99 See, e.g., State ex ret. Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d.882, 890 (Mo. 1960); Seward
County Bd. of Comm'rs v. City of Seward, 196 Neb. 266, 275-76, 242 N.W.2d 849, 854-55
(1976).
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restricted."° A recent decision of the Illinois Court of Appeals acknowledged
the public policy justification for the governmental-proprietary distinction in
tort cases, but refused to extend the rule to an intergovernmental zoning con-
troversy.'°' The court commented that "ftihe reasons of policy which ac-
counted for the development of this distinction fin tort] have little validity or
application in resolving the present conflict of the powers of two public
bodies. 7'102 The implication from this comment is that, although the
governmental-proprietary distinction may be valid as a device to limit govern-
mental immunity in tort, it should not be used as a device to grant governmen-
tal immunity from zoning. Moreover, although it may be justified in a dispute
between a government entity and an individual, it is not a justifiable distinc-
tion in a dispute between two public parties representing relatively equal in-
terests.
The third general criticism of the governmental-proprietary rule is
directed at the courts that distinguish between mandatory and permissive func-
tions and grant immunity in order not to frustrate a legislative or societal man-
date. Unless the zoning scheme of the local government entity forbids the pro-
posed activity entirely, the mandate is not frustrated by requiring that it be ex-
ercised in conformity with the local zoning ordinances.' 03 Several courts,
therefore, have held that the conflict between the development plans of the in-
truding government and the land-use plans of the host government is recon-
cilable,'" and that such reconciliation is preferable to annulment of either par-
ty's proposals.' 05 In addition, the enactment of zoning ordinances has been
recognized as a governmental function, carried out for the essential purpose of
protecting the health, safety and welfare of the public. 1 °6 If both parties are act-
ing in their governmental capacities, the justification for upholding zoning or-
dinances seems equal to, not subordinate to, the justification for upholding the
intruding government's action.
In recognition of the shortcomings of the governmental-proprietary test,
several jurisdictions have reduced its vitality, without discarding it
altogether. ]° 7 Some courts apply the rule only when a municipality claims im-
'°° State ex rel. Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 882, 890 (Mo. 1960); Cloyes v. Township of
Delaware, 23 N.J. 324, 327-29, 129 A.2d 1, 2-4 (1957).
'°' O'Conner v. City of Rockford, 3 Ill. App. 3d 548, 551, 279 N.E.2d 356, 359 (1972),
rev'd on other grounds, 52 III. 2d 360, 288 N.E.2d 432 (1972).
102 Id. at 551, 279 N.E.2d at 359.
103
	
v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1980) (citing
City of Richmond v. Board of Supervisors, 199 Va. 679, 686, 101 S.E.2d 641, 646 (1958) (city
sought to construct prison on land zoned 'agricultural' by county; city has no power to select the
location, therefore the ordinance does not impair the city's right to establish the prison)).
104 City of Richmond v. Board of Supervisors, 199 Va. 679, 686, 101 S.E.2d 641, 646
(1958).
'° St. Louis County v. City of Manchester, 360 S.W.2c1 630, 640 (Mo. 1962);
Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1980).
1 °6 See, e.g,, St. Louis County v. City of Manchester, 360 S.W.2d 638, 640 (Mo. 1962);
Wippler v. Hohn, 341 Mo. 780, 785-86, 110 S.W.2d 409, 411 (1937).
1 " See, e.g., cases cited at notes 108 and 109 infra.
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munity from its own zoning ordinances, and apply a different test to controver-
sies involving outside government entities.'° 8 Other courts hold that the im-
munity conferred by the test is qualified, and that the intruding government
must act in a reasonable manner. 1 °9
 Because of the broad judicial discretion
that has been exercised by the courts in deciding whether an activity is govern-
mental or proprietary, this test appears to be the most flexible of the sole-factor
tests. The courts thus seem more willing to retain and modify it than the other
traditional tests.
D. Analysis of Traditional Tests
The common result of the traditional tests is that immunity is accorded the
intruding government."° Immunity from zoning can frustrate the entire land-
use allocation scheme of a state subdivision. While a denial of immunity may
similarly frustrate the development plans of the intruding government, the
likelihood of such a result is less substantial because of the usual presence of
alternative sites, and therefore it does not support the frequency with which
courts have granted immunity. Moreover, the court's propensity to grant im-
munity frustrates the likelihood of cooperation and compromise between the
competing government units. If immunity were predicated on the cir-
cumstances of the controversy rather than on the governmental relationship,
the intruding government would be induced to approach the zoning authority
in an effort to obtain approval for its proposed project. Such a rule would
minimize the danger of an intruding government disrupting the land-use plans
of the host government. Even if immunity was later found to be justified, the
intruding government's decision would be based on a more complete apprecia-
tion of the local government's interests and a more complete analysis of alter-
native sites and methods.
The courts' propensity to grant immunity thus hinders the likelihood of
reasonable usage of land. Moreover, in the interest of maintaining easily ap-
plicable standards, the courts that continue to apply the traditional tests fail to
address many factors relevant to a fair resolution of the controversy. For exam-
ple, there is no effort to determine whether the zoning plan permits the pro-
posed use at an alternative site. If such a site exists, the conflict between the
zoning power and the power to use land is reconcilable, since both powers can
be exercised fully. Under such circumstances, there is no valid justification for
negating the applicable zoning ordinances. To subordinate all zoning or-
' 1)8 See, e.g., AlA Mobile Home Park, Inc. v. Brevard County, 246 So, 2d 126, 131 (Fla.
App. 1971) (applying governmental-proprietary distinction to intramunicipal zoning immunity
controversy); Orange County v. City of Apopka, 299 So. 2d 652, 654 (Fla. App. 1974)
(acknowledging rule in AlA  Mobile Home Park, but refusing to apply the test in intergovernmental
zoning immunity controversy).
'°9 See, e.g., Conners v. New York State Ass'n of Retarded Children, Inc., 82 Misc. 2d
861, 864, 370 N.Y.S.2d 474, 477 (1975).
"r' Comment, Balancing Interests to Determine Governmental Exemption from Zoning Laws, 1973
U. ILL. L. F. 125, 125. See also cases cited at notes 14-17 supra.
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dinances, without considering the degree to which they infringe on the pro-
posed project, or the degree to which the specific site is essential to the project,
is arbitrary.
In addition, the factors that are determinative under the traditional tests
bear little relation to the substantive elements of the dispute. The existence of
the power of eminent domain, or the governmental nature of an activity,
neither ensure that the project's proponents are qualified to make land-use
allocation decisions that minimize the impact on legitimate local interests, nor
do they establish that the intruding government's project is inherently superior
to zoning, which is also a governmental activity premised on a sovereign
power. The superior sovereignty test may have been justified at one time on the
merits of preventing local infringement on state activities. This justification,
however, has been weakened by the present diffusion of state powers to an in-
creasingly broad spectrum of state•agencies for purposes ranging from hospitals
and universities to liquor distributors,"' trailer parks, 112 and rest room
facilities."' A rule that does not distinguish between these functions shows no
semblance of fairness and does not address the true substance of the controver-
sy. The essential issue should be whether the public benefit of the proposed
project requires that legitimate local interests be subordinated. This issue
should not turn on the powers delegated to the intruding government, but
rather on the equitable considerations underlying the controversy as a whole.
II. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
The recent trend among courts that have criticized the three traditional
tests is to examine all relevant factors of the dispute in an effort to make the
decision that will maximize the public benefit. In contrast to the traditional
tests, no single factor is determinative. Three different tests have developed.
The first test, developed by the New ,Jersey Supreme Court, balances the
parties' interests in the context of ascertaining the intent of the legislature on
the issue of immunity, and then, if immunity is granted, examines the reason-
ableness of the initial land-use decision."* The second test, developed by the
Florida Supreme Court, denies the intruding entity the opportunity to assert
immunity, but allows the intruding government to challenge the reasonable-
ness of the zoning board's decision on the ground that the specific interests
favoring the proposed use outweigh the host government's interests. 15 The
"I See, e.g., Salt Lake County v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 11 Utah 2d 235, 237-38, 357
P.2d 488, 490 (1960).
1'2 See, e.g., Township of Lower Allen v. Commonwealth, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 272,
272-75, 310 A.2d 90, 90-91 (1973).
1 " See, e.g., Brown v. Kansas Forestry, Fish & Game Comm'n, 2 Kan. App. 2d 102,
105, 576 P.2d 230, 232 (1978) (rejection of state commission's superior sovereignty argument).
'" Rutgers, State Univ. v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 152-53, 286 A.2d 697, 702-03 (1972).
'" City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass' n for Retarded Citizens, 322 So. 2d 571,
579 (Fla. App. 1975), aff'd, 332 So. 2d 610, 612-13 (Fla. 1976).
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third test, developed by the North Dakota Supreme Court, combines elements
of the first two." 6 The North Dakota test allows an assertion of immunity, as
well as an assertion of unreasonableness, but decides immunity by balancing
the specific interests of the parties in the context of the specific facts before the
court.'"
A. The New, 	 Response
The first alternative approach was developed in Rutgers, State University v.
Piluso." 8 In Rutgers, a state agency, charged with the operation of the state
University, sought to construct student housing units in excess of the max-
imum number permitted by the zoning ordinances of Piscataway Township. 19
The University applied for a variance from the Piscataway zoning board, but it
was denied. After its application was turned down, the University brought suit
seeking a judicial declaration that, as a state agency, its activities were immune
from local zoning.'" The trial court granted the University's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the ground that the University was an instrumentality of the
state."'
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New jersey affirmed the grant of im-
munity, 122 but criticized the traditional tests used to decide immunity, stating
that they were too simplistic.' 23 The court instead adopted a new test wherein
the legislative intent of each party's enabling act is determinative."' In this
new test, the legislative intent is to be "divined from a consideration of many
factors, with a value judgment reached on an overall evaluation."'" The fac-
tors that the court considered to be indicative of legislative intent were: "the
nature and scope of the instrumentality seeking immunity, the kind of function
or land use involved, the extent of the public interest to be served thereby, the
effect local land-use regulation would have upon the enterprise concerned and
the impact upon legitimate local interests." 126 After applying these factors to
the facts at hand, the court held that the legislature intended that the growth
and development of the University be immune from local land-use
regulations.'" This legislative intent was divined from the University's having
76 City of Fargo v. Harwood Twp., 256 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1977).
"7 Id. at 698-99.
60 N.J. 142, 286 A.2d 697 (1972).
11 " Id. at 147, 286 A.2d at 699.
120 Id.
121 113 N.J. Super. 65, 70, 272 A.2d 573, 576 (1971). The trial court applied the
superior-sovereignty test, yet it also examined the policy objective underlying the statutory grant
of authority to the University. Id. at 70-73, 272 A.2d at 576-77.
122 60 N.J. at 159, 286 A.2d at 706.
123 Id. at 150, 286 A.2d at 701.
"4 Id. at 152, 286 A.2d at 702.
126 Id. at 152-53, 286 A.2d at 702.
176
 Id. at 153, 286 A.2d at 702.
" 7 Id. at 153, 286 A.2d at 703.
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been established as an instrumentality of the state to perform an "essential
governmental function for the benefit of all the people of the state. >'128
The court qualified the University's immunity by adopting a second tier
of analysis wherein the court scrutinized the reasonableness of the University's
exercise of its decisionmaking power. The standard of reasonableness was
whether the immunity was exercised in such a manner as to arbitrarily over-
ride all important legitimate local interests."'" In this case the court found
that the local interests asserted by Piscataway were not legitimate, and that the
University had applied for a variance, and it concluded, therefore, that the ac-
tion of the University in violation of the ordinance was not unreasonable.'"
Thus, Rutgers established a two-tier test in which the court first decides whether
immunity is warranted on the basis of an inference of legislative intent, and, if
it is, the court then examines the specific land-use proposal to ensure that it is
not arbitrary.
Several elements of the Rutgers test are noteworthy. First, the factors ex-
amined by the court indicate an appreciation of the true nature of the con-
troversy. The dispute is between government entities seeking to maximize the
benefits to their constituencies, and the resolution of the dispute should turn on
a comparison of the merits of these competing public interests. Second, the fac-
tors considered by the court in deciding the issue of immunity are greatly ex-
panded over the sole-factor tests. By looking to many factors that together com-
prise legislative intent, instead of a single factor, the court approaches more
closely the true intent of the legislature. Finally, the nature of the test as a two-
tiered analysis ensures review of the interests that underlie not only the nature
of the intruding government's powers but also the specific exercise of those
powers. Through this bifurcated review, the Rutgers court incorporated many
factors that are appropriate to the resolution of the controversy.
In addition to evaluating many appropriate factors in making its decision,
the Rutgers analysis also seeks to maximize predictability. By imputing its de-
cision on immunity to the legislature, predictability is enhanced because the
determinative issues relate to general legislative policies rather than specific ad-
judicative facts. Indeed, the Rutgers court stated that most state agencies en-
gaged in essential state activities will be granted immunity on the basis of a
finding of legislative intent to grant immunity."' Local governments, presum-
ably, can expect to be bound by zoning ordinances. Moreover, the court also
emphasized the issues that relate to the nature of the proposed activity rather
than those issues that relate to the specific manner in which the parties have
"8 Id.
129 Id.
13° Id. at 154, 286 A.2d at 703. Although the reasonableness of Piscataway's zoning or-
dinance itself was not at issue, the court expressed a strong aversion to the objectives of the or-
dinance. According to the court, the ordinance was probably enacted to prevent the disputed
property from becoming exempt from local property taxes and to avoid the need to establish a
new elementary school. Id. at 148-49, 286 A.2d at 700-01.
131 Id. at 153, 286 A.2d at 703.
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sought to effectuate that activity. The latter issues are considered only to the
extent that they bear on the arbitrariness of an immune intruding
government's proposals.
A recent decision applying the Rutgers test focused on the issue of ar-
bitrariness and indicated the extent to which the specific exercise of decision-
making power will be scrutinized. in Pemberton Township v. State,'" a New
Jersey Superior Court applied the Rutgers test to determine whether a group
home for juvenile delinquents proposed by the state Department of Corrections
could be established in a residential district of Pemberton Township. 133 The
Department ignored the township's zoning ordinances, "proceeding under
the impression that the State was immune from such restrictions,"'" and pur-
chased the property for conversion without reading or discussing the applicable
zoning regulations.'" The controversy reached the court when the township
sought a restraining order to prevent the group horne.' 36 The court analyzed
immunity by examining each factor enumerated in Rutgers, and found that the
legislature intended that the Department not be restrained by local
regulations.'" Despite a finding that the proposed project would have a severe
adverse impact on the township's legitimate interests,'" immunity was
granted.' 39
Having granted immunity, the court next analyzed the issue of the reason-
ableness of the Department of Corrections' decisionmaking process and held
that the Department's conduct was not reasonable.'" Rutgers was cited for the
equitable proposition that "the instrumentality ought to consult with the local
authorities and sympathetically listen and give every consideration to local ob-
jections, problems and suggestions." 14 ' The court found that, for the Depart-
ment to meet its burden of reasonableness, it would have had to consider af-
'" 171 N. J. Super. 287, 408 A.2d 832 (1979).
133 Id. at 289, 408 A.2d at 833.
'" Id. at 291, 408 A.2d at 834.
1 " Id. at 291, 408 A.2d at 834.
136 Id. at 287, 408 A.2d at 832 (court's syllabus).
1 " Id. at 300-03, 408 A.2d at 839-40. The court found that the Department of Correc-
tions was a state agency performing an essential function for all the citizens of the state, that the
proposed use of the property was not remotely different from neighboring uses, that the social
utility of the proposed project was great, that the possible effect of zoning ordinances on the
state's project was great, and the potential adverse local impact was severe. Id. at 300-01, 408
A.2d at 839.
"B Id. at 301, 408 A.2d at 8.39.
739 Id. at 303, 408 A.2d at 840.
140 Id. at 304-09, 408 A.2d at 841-43.
Id. at 304, 408 A .2d at 841. The court's conclusion as to the standard to be applied to
determine, reasonableness was primarily based on the Rutgers test. The court also discussed the
Municipal Land Use Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40.55D (West Supp. 1981), enacted subsequent
to the Rutgers decision, to support its holding. The underlying policy of this statute is to require
assimilation of local land-use decisions in state development proposals. 171 N.J. Super. at 306,
408 A.2d at 842 (quoting Garden State Farms, Inc. v. Bay, 77 N.J. 439, 455-56, 390 A.2d 1177,
1185 (1978)). The Pemberton standard is substantially similar to the Rutgers standard, and its re-
quirements may be imposed by a court even in the absence of such a statute.
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firmatively the land-use ordinances applicable to the site selected, and to state
"valid reasons" if it decided to reject them. 142 Though the court did not man-
date a variance procedure, it did express the requirement "that a sufficient op-
portunity be provided for local citizens to air their concerns."'" The court also
emphasized the importance for the municipality affected by a nonconforming
use to have available to it "as much information as possible in order to know
the local consequences likely to result." 144 Since the above requirements were
not satisfied by the Department of Corrections prior to its decision to proceed
with the community house, the permanent restraining order was granted,
despite the Department's immunity. 145
The Pemberton decision is important for two reasons. First, it demonstrated
a valid attempt to distinguish between the issues involved in an analysis of im-
munity and the issues involved in an analysis of reasonableness. Second, the
decision focused on the affirmative burden of reasonableness imposed on the
intruding government, and clarified the essential elements of that burden.
Each of these features represents the court's interpretation of the test that was
developed by the Supreme Court in Rutgers.
The first notable feature of Pemberton is the distinction that was made be-
tween issues bearing on immunity and issues bearing on reasonableness. The
immunity issue, again based on an inference of legislative intent, was decided
on the basis of the nature and scope of the instrumentality seeking immunity as
well as the nature of the authority conferred on that instrumentality. 146 The
superior court spoke in general policy terms and did not address the specific ex-
ercise of the powers conferred on each party."' The court's considerations thus
approximated those confronting the legislature in enacting the township's zon-
ing enabling act and the Department's development enabling act. The
reasonableness issue was then decided by examining the specific manner in
which the intruding government exercised its decisionmaking authority.'" In
the context of reasonableness, the court focused on the failure of the intruding
government to provide adequate opportunity for a public hearing and to
scrutinize local interests and zoning ordinances. 149 Thus, the Pemberton court
examined separately the general policy issues underlying the legislative en-
abling acts and the specific procedural issues underlying the exercise of deci-
sionmaking authority.
The second notable feature of Pemberton was the court's explication of the
'" 171 N.J. Super. at 309, 408 A.2d at 843.
' 49 Id.
144 Id. at 307, 408 A.2d at 842.
145 Id. at 308-09, 408 A.2d at 843.
116
 Id. at 300-01, 408 A.2d at 839.
147 Id. For example, the court analyzed the importance of community life in the
rehabilitation process and the possibility that zoning ordinances in communities throughout the
state could frustrate the Department's programs. Id.
"a Id. at 307-08, 408 A.2d at 842-43. For example, the court discussed the lack of effort
by the intruding government to investigate alternatives and to present guidelines to the com-
munity to ensure consistent operation of the institution. Id.
i 49 Id. at 308, 309, 408 A.2d at 843.
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affirmative burden imposed on the intruding government to ensure that its ac-
tions were reasonable. The court held that the intruding government's decision
will be struck down as arbitrary unless it is based on a "careful balancing of the
need for the undertaking against its negative effects upon the community, '3150
after full opportunity for "local citizens to air their concerns. "151 The court ex-
pressed an aversion to permitting the Department to make a unilateral decision
to ignore local zoning, and, therefore, required the intruding government to af-
firmatively consider the effects of the proposed use on the host government's'
The Pemberton decision demonstrates that the protections afforded by the re-
quirement of reasonableness are primarily procedural. Substantive issues were
addressed in the balancing of interests performed by the court to decide im-
munity. The only possible substantive protection afforded by the requirement
of reasonableness is that adverse local impacts may be ignored only for a valid
reason. So long as reasonable efforts are made to ascertain the legitimate con-
cerns of the locality, however, it is unlikely that this requirement will be suffi-
cient to cancel a project, although it may force a modification of plans.'"
The result in Pemberton demonstrates the compromising nature of the New
Jersey test. Even though the intruding government's interests may be suffi-
ciently strong to justify immunity, the primary benefit of immunity — in-
dependent decisionmaking — is sharply curtailed by the procedural require-
ment that the agency listen to local concerns. Conversely, although the host
government's interests must be given "genuine consideration" by an immune,
intruding government, the intruding government still may make the initial
decision without applying for a variance, and still may ignore the host govern-
ment's interests if it can state valid reasons for disregarding them.' 54 Further-
more, since an immune, intruding government need not apply for a variance,
the host government will bear the burden of going forward with a judicial suit
to halt the proposed land use on the ground that local interests were arbitrarily
overridden. The merits of this compromise arrangement can best be analyzed
after a comparison with the Florida and North Dakota approaches.
B. The Florida Response
The second alternative test developed independently of and simultaneous-
ly with the New Jersey test. 155
 The Florida Supreme Court adopted the test in
"° Id. at 309, 408 A.2d at 843.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 304, 408 A.2d at 841.
"3 The Supreme Court of New Jersey set out an example of an "unreasonable" deci-
sion by an intruding government: " ... it would be arbitrary, if the state proposed to erect an of-
fice building in the crowded business district of a city where provision for off-street parking was
required, for the state not to make some reasonable provision in that respect ..." Rutgers, State
Univ. v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 153-54, 286 A.2d 697, 703 (1972).
154 Pemberton Twp., 171 N.J. Super. at 309, 408 A.2d at 84-3.
"3 The Supreme Court of Minnesota, three months after Rutgers, and without citing
Rutgers, adopted a balancing of interests test in Town of Oronoca v. City of Rochester, 293
Minn. 468, 197 N.W.2d (1972). The court rejected traditional tests as accentuating form over
802	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 22:783
City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Association of Retarded Citizens. 136 In this case,
a state agency began operation of a daycare center for retarded citizens in a
house located in a residential district in the City of Temple Terrace, without
applying to the zoning authority for a variance. 137 To prevent continued opera-
tion of the center, the city sued for an injunction.' 58 The trial court denied the
city's request for an injunction, and granted immunity to the state agency on
the basis of the superior-sovereignty test.'" The district court of appeals re-
versed.' 6° In so doing, it examined and rejected each of the three traditional
sole-factor tests, summarizing the deficiencies of each,' 81 before settling on an
interest balancing approach, as the "fairest method by which this type of case
can be decided ." ' 62
The appellate court stated that, under the balancing of interests approach,
it would generally require the intruding governmental unit first to apply to.the
zoning authority of the host government for zoning board approval.' 63 The ap-
peals court articulated two exceptions to this requirement: (1) when the
legislature has expressly granted immunity, 164 and (2) when the intruding
government is "so convinced of the overriding public need for a particular
land-use that it decides to go forward without resort to local authorities. 77165 On
a petition for rehearing, the court of appeals recognized that the issues were of
great public interest and, therefore, certified the case to the Supreme Court of
Florida. ' 86
The Supreme Court affirmed the appeals court decision and adopted the
balancing of interests test set forth in the appeals court decision, with one varia-
tion. 167 The Supreme Court, by implication, rejected the second exception to
the variance requirement, which would have allowed an intruding government
substance, and adopted a new test which balances the need for the proposed use against the threat
to the host government. Id. at 471, 197 N.W.2d at 428-29. On the basis of this test, immunity
was granted to the city for the establishment of a solid waste disposal facility in an agricultural
district of the township. Id. at 472, 197 N.W.2d at 429-30.
The District Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Florida followed Oronoco in
Orange County v. City of Apopka, 299 So. 2d 652 (Fla. App. 1974). In that case, a tri-city air-
port authority sought to establish an airport in an agricultural district of a county. Id. at 653. The
court followed Oronoco's balancing of interests approach and adopted a test that is substantially
similar to that ultimately adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in Temple Terrace. Id. at 655-56.
The Orange County court remanded the case to the circuit court to enter a judgment declaring the
airport property subject to zoning. Id. at 656.
156 322 So. 2d 571 (Fla. App. 1975), aff'd, 332 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1976).
157 322 So. 2d at 572, 573.
' 68 Id. at 573.
149 Id. at 573, 579.
16°
 Id. at 579.
161
 Id. at 576-78.
L62 Id. at 578.
163
 Id. at 579.
164
 Id. at 578.
165 Id. at 579.
166
 Id. at 580.
167 332 So. 2d 610, 613.
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to proceed without petitioning the local zoning board if it was convinced of an
overriding public need for the proposed project.'" Instead, the Supreme Court
commanded a petition to the local zoning authority in all cases when there is no
express legislative grant of immunity. 169
Under the Florida test, therefore, the intruding government must submit
to the zoning board's decisionmaking authority in all cases where there is no
express legislative conferral of immunity. The zoning board must decide
whether to allow the proposed use by balancing "the applicant's need for the
use in question and its effect upon the host unit's zoning plan, neighboring
property, environmental impact, and the myriad other relevant factors.,,I70 In
the event that a zoning permit is denied, and the applicant is dissatisfied, the
applicant is then entitled to judicial review of the interest balancing performed
by the zoning board."' The issue at trial is whether the zoning board's decision
was reasonable, in light of several factors: "the type of function involved, the
applicant's legislative grant of authority, the public need therefor, the existing
land-use scheme, alternative locations for the facility in less restrictive zoning
areas, alternative methods for providing the needed improvement, and the
detriment to the adjoining landowners."'" In the event the denial of the
variance is deemed unreasonable, the specific zoning ordinance will be held in-
applicable to the specific proposed use.'"
The Temple Terrace decision departs from Rutgers in two ways. First, the
Florida court rejects Rutgers' emphasis on legislative intent. Second, courts
following the Florida approach apply the balancing test to the issue of reason-
ableness rather than the issue of immunity. As a result of these two departures,
the Florida test is more flexible and offers considerably more protection to local
interests than the New .jersey test.
The first distinction between Temple Terrace and Rutgers is the Florida
court's rejection of Rutgers' emphasis on legislative intent. The Rutgers ap-
'" See text at note 165 supra.
' 5' 332 So. 2d at 613. The supreme court's opinion is ambiguous with regard to this
issue. At one point, the court states: "We adopt [the appeals court] opinion as our own." Id. at
612. At another point, the opinion states: "[e]xcept where a specific legislative directive requires
a non-conforming use in the particular area, local administrative proceedings will provide the
forum in which the competing interests of local governmental bodies are weighed." Id. at 613
(footnote omitted). The supreme court apparently interpreted the appeals court decision as re-
quiring local approval in all cases. Id. at 612 n.3. But see Pal-Mar Water Management Dist. v.
Martin County, 377 So. 2d 752 (Fla. App. 1979). In this case, the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peals of Florida interpreted the Temple Terrace standard as permitting an assertion of immunity
based on an overwhelming public need for the proposed project. Id. at 755. Though the court in
Pal-Mar was willing to entertain an assertion of immunity, it found that the state agency failed to
meet its burden of proving public necessity and, therefore, was required to petition the zoning
board for approval. Id.
17° 322 So. 2d at 576 (quoting Orange County v. City of Apopka, 299 So. 2d 652, 655
(Fla. App. 1974)).
171 Id.
'" Id.
I" Id.
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proach weighs the competing interests in the context of an effort to discern the
legislative intent underlying the intruding government's enabling act.' 74
 The
New jersey test, therefore, balances general policy issues.'" Furthermore, in
comparison to the Florida test, the New jersey test resembles somewhat the
traditional, sole-factor tests, in that it will generally result in a finding of
legislative intent to immunize state agencies engaged in important activities. "6
In contrast, in the Florida test, competing interests are considered in light of
the specific facts of the controversy before the court. "7
 The specific need for the
particular parcel is weighed against the local objections to the development of
the project in the proposed manner and location)" The Temple Terrace ap-
proach balances the parties' interests to ascertain which land-use, that directed
by the zoning ordinance, or that proposed by the intruding government, will
maximize the public benefit.'" Temple Terrace thus acknowledges the diversity
of factual settings that characterizes intergovernmental zoning controversies
generally.
The second distinction is that the Florida courts, in contrast to their New
jersey counterparts, place exclusive emphasis on the reasonableness of the zon-
ing board's decision. In the Rutgers test, the principal issue is whether immuni-
ty should result)" Reasonableness is a secondary consideration offering
primarily procedural protection to the host government's interests.' 81 In New
Jersey, so long as the intruding government meets the test for immunity and
has exercised that immunity with some concern for local interests, the proposed
development can proceed.' 82 In Temple Terrace, however, absent express
statutory immunity, the intruding government is always required to submit its
case to the zoning board and the board's decision will stand unless the public
need for the specific development on the specific site outweighs the effect on the
existing land-use scheme, or there are no feasible alternative sites or
methods.'" Only where the court decides that the public would be benefitted
more by allowing the proposed project than by prohibiting it will the project be
allowed to proceed.
In making this decision, the Florida court ascertains whether the local
zoning plan permits the proposed use at an alternative site.'" A host govern-
ment, therefore, can affect the final decision by providing for the proposed use
at an alternative site. Moreover, the host government always makes the initial
174 60 N.J. 142, 152-53, 286 A.2d 697, 702-03.
/75 Id.
"6 Id. at 153, 286 A.2d at 703.
17 Temple Terrace, 322 So. 2d at 578.
. 178 Id. at 576.
'" Id. at 579.
l'u See text at notes 122-28 supra.
' 8 ' See text at notes 150-53 supra.
182 Pemberton Twp., 171 N.J. Super. at 308-09, 408 A.2d at 843.
183 322 So. 2d at 576, 579.
184 Id.
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decision through its variance procedure.' 85 The burden of bringing a judicial
suit, therefore, lies with the intruding government. Finally, a decision that the
specific proposed project can proceed does not exempt future projects proposed
by the intruding government from the requirement that they comply with zon-
ing. Hence, the Florida approach provides greater procedural and substantive
protections to the host government.
In summary, the Temple Terrace approach exhibits greater flexibility than
the Rutgers approach. In Temple Terrace, the equities that are balanced relate to
the policies and interests that are unique to the factual situation before the
court, rather than those which are generally before the legislature. Further-
more, the interest balancing occurs only in the context of an examination of the
reasonableness of the zoning board's land-use decision. Since the Florida
courts forbid an assertion of immunity by an intruding government unless the
assertion is based on a specific statutory grant, greater deference is accorded
the local government entity's zoning authority. Nevertheless, the Florida
court's failure to permit a claim of immunity means that the court ignores
several valid interests of the intruding government that bear on the issue of
whether the intruding government should be free to make the initial land-use
decision. Since there will be situations where an intruding government should
be free to make the initial land-use decision, 186 an assertion of immunity should
be permitted. Recently, the Supreme Court of North Dakota adopted a balanc-
ing of interests test that combines elements of the New jersey and Florida ap-
proaches. An analysis of this test will indicate further the merits of each ap-
proach.
C . The North Dakota Response
The Supreme Court of North Dakota adopted an interest balancing ap-
proach in City of Fargo v. Harwood Towns& p.' 67 In this case, the City of Fargo at-
tempted to develop a sanitary landfill on property outside the city limits that
was zoned by the township for residential and agricultural uses only.'" The ci-
ty applied to the township for reclassification, but its application was denied.'"
Fargo, rather than appealing from the denial of reclassification, sued for a
declaratory judgment that it was immune from Harwood Township's zoning
ordinances.'" Since the city sought to proceed without zoning approval, the
reasonableness of the zoning board's decision was not at issue. 18 ' The district
court decided that the city was not immune from the zoning ordinances, and
the city appealed to the state supreme court. 192
"5 Temple Terrace, 332 So. 2d at 613.
188 See text at notes 213-17 infra.
187 256 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1977).
188 Id. at 695.
188 Id.
' 9° Id.
181 Id. at 700.
142 Id. at 695.
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On appeal, the city relied solely on the eminent domain test.'" The
supreme court rejected this test and instead adopted a balancing of interests
test.'" The test that was adopted permits an assertion of immunity, but im-
poses on the intruding government the affirmative burden of proving that the
public interest favors allowing the proposed use. 195 In deciding immunity, the
court weighed the policy implications raised by the specific exercise of the city's
power to develop an extraterritorial landfill. 196 An examination of all relevant
factors convinced the court that the city failed to prove either sufficient need for
the specific site or adequate study of alternatives, and therefore, immunity was
denied. 197 In an aside, the court stressed that the reasonableness of the zoning
board's denial of reclassification was not before the court, but stated that the
issues that would arise in such a claim would be the legal sufficiency of the
board's decision and whether the decision was based on improper considera-
tions, such as local bias.'"
The North Dakota approach, therefore, rejects the Rutgers court's ap-
proach to the balancing of competing interests in favor of the Temple Terrace ap-
proach. The Rutgers court reached a decision on the balance of interests in the
context of legislative intent as divined by weighing the statutory grants of
power. The North Dakota court, in contrast, focused on the issues discussed in
the Florida test, namely the specific necessity for the proposed project and the
selected site as well as the specific adverse effects that would result to either par-
ty by a grant or denial of authority to proceed with the proposed development.
In Fargo, the court found that the intruding government had failed to prove that
the need for the specific site outweighed the adverse impact on the host govern-
ment. 199
 This finding was based on the court's determination that many alter-
native sites for the landfill existed, and that the site selected was particularly
suited for residential development. 260
Thus, to the extent that the controversies are to be decided on a case-by-
case basis, looking to the specific substantive conflict between the exercise of
the powers by each party, North Dakota follows the Florida approach. Unlike
the Florida approach, however, Fargo adopted a two-tier analysis. The balanc-
ing of interests occurred in the context of immunity, rather than
1 " Id. at 696.
194
 Id. at 698.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 699. The court considered the following factors: (1) the city did not study alter-
native methods or locations or the threat of flooding; (2) Fargo's current landfill, using a similar
method, had been cited as a nuisance and was the subject of numerous complaints; (3) alter-
native sites existed which were generally suitable for the landfill; (4) the landfill would seriously
affect the community and local property values; and (5) the property was wooded and scenic and
highly desirable for residential use. Id.
197 Id. at 700.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 699, 700.
2°° Id. at 699.
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reasonableness, and reasonableness then was decided on the basis of the factors
used in the Rutgers test for reasonableness. 201
The Fargo court, therefore, allows the intruding entity to make the initial
land-use decision, if it is able to prove sufficient necessity for the specific site
selected to override local interests. Otherwise, the North Dakota Supreme
Court held, an intruding government must comply with local zoning. Finally,
the court leaves open the possibility of an appeal from the local zoning board's
denial of reclassification on the ground that the board's denial was
unreasonable. 202 The North Dakota court, therefore, incorporated elements of
both the New Jersey approach and the Florida approach. The Fargo court, like
the Rutgers court, permits the intruding government to assert immunity prior
to, or in lieu of, a claim that the host government's actions are unreasonable.
In contrast to Temple Terrace, therefore, Fargo applies a bifurcated analysis.
Nevertheless, in deciding the issue of immunity, the Fargo court rejects New
Jersey's emphasis on the legislative intent underlying the enabling acts. North
Dakota thus assimilates an element of the Temple Terrace test as well. By em-
phasizing the interests that relate to the specific factual setting of the case
before the court, the Fargo test exhibits the same heightened flexibility that
characterizes the Temple Terrace test.
IR. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
Flexibility is only one element of the balancing of interests approach that
renders the approach preferable to the traditional, sole-factor tests. Another
advantage of the balancing tests is that they reject the factors that are solely
determinative under the traditional tests. Those factors are only remotely
related to determining which party's interests are paramount in a particular
case. Moreover, the sole-factor tests fail to consider whether the proposed use
can be reconciled with the local zoning plan. The alternative tests, in contrast,
have focused increasingly on reconciliation and on cooperation between the
parties. Their concentration on the interests underlying the specific disconso-
nant decisions of the parties further ensures that the public benefit will be max-
imized.
Despite these advantages, several courts that recently have had the oppor-
tunity to adopt the alternative tests have chosen instead to continue to apply
the traditional tests."' The Supreme Court of Nebraska, for example, recently
rejected the interest balancing approach on the ground that the approach "has
its disadvantages because of lack of guidelines for its operation and increased
201 Id. at 700.
202 Id.
203
 See, e.g., Kunimoto vi Kawakami, 56 Hawaii 582, 585 -86:545 P.2d 684, 686 -87
(1976); City of New Orleans v. Stale, 364 So. 2d 1020, 1023 (La. 1978); Seward County Bd. of
Comm'rs v. City of Seward, 196 Neb. 266, 274, 242 N.W.2d 849, 854 (1976).
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difficulties of application. '1204 This criticism, however, does not withstand
•scrutiny, nor can it justify retention of the traditional tests. The governmental-
proprietary and superior sovereignty "guidelines" offer extremely limited
guidance, as a review of precedents indicates. 205 Furthermore, the
"guidelines" of the traditional tests, the presence of the right to condemn,
superior sovereignty, and the governmental-proprietary distinction, divert the
courts' focus from the true substance of the controversy. They achieve
theoretical ease of application at the expense of reasoned adjudication of the
controversy and at the cost of ignoring several extremely relevant factors.
Courts that desire to focus on the real issues of the controversy by adopt-
ing a balancing of interests test need not have hopelessly complex and un-
predictable guidelines. Instead, effective guidelines that enhance predictability
of issues and outcomes can be formulated. In achieving these guidelines, it is
first necessary to decide whether, and for what purpose, both an assertion of
immunity and an assertion of unreasonableness will be entertained. It is then
necessary to decide. what issues and interests are relevant to the resolution of
each claim. Decisions to date by courts applying the balancing of interests test
have not set forth cogent reasons for their decisions on these two points. As a
result, no clear guidelines have been formulated. The variations of the balanc-
ing approach, and some possible modifications, will be discussed below in an
effort to devise guidelines that will focus judicial review on the true issues.
The courts are divided on whether to allow an assertion of immunity as
well as an assertion of unreasonableness. The New Jersey courts and the Fargo
court allow an intruding government to present a case for immunity which, if
successful, would allow it to make the initial land-use decision. 204
 In contrast,
the Temple Terrace court requires the intruding government to submit its plans
to local zoning boards in all cases except where there is an express statutory ex-
emption. 207
 This latter court inquires only into the reasonableness of the local
zoning board's decision. 208 The courts are also divided on the context in which
the courts balance the relevant interests. The New Jersey cases principally ex-
amine general policy issues in the context of the legislative intent of the in-
truding government's enabling act. 209 In contrast, Florida and North Dakota
balance the specific policy implications of the factual setting before the court,
on a case-by-case basis. 2 t° The Florida courts perform this balancing to deter-
mine reasonableness, 2 " while the North Dakota courts balance the specific in-
204 Seward County Bd, of Comm'rs v. City of Seward, 196 Neb. 266, 276, 242 N.W.2d
849, 855 (1976).
2" See text and notes at notes 70-76, 91, 94-98 supra.
20e
	
60 N.J. at 152-53, 286 A.2d at 702; Fargo, 256 N.W.2d at 698-99.
207 332 So. 2d at 613.
2°e So. 2d at 579.
2" Rutgers, 60 N.J. at 152-53, 286 A.2d at 702.
210
 Temple Terrace, 322 So. 2d at 576, 579; Fargo, 256 N.W.2d at 698-99.
2 " 322 So. 2d at 576, 579.
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terests to determine immunity. 212 Because of this ad hoc balancing, the Florida
and North Dakota approaches maximize flexibility and thus are able to re-
spond to the diverse factual situations of each case.
The Florida approach, which prohibits an assertion of immunity,
recognizes the risks of allowing an intruding government to make land-use
decisions. Unilateral decisionmaking by an intruding government is likely to
frustrate the achievement of local objectives and is difficult to review since such
decisionmaking lacks the developed administrative record of a zoning hearing.
It forces a host government to initiate costly and time consuming litigation to
protect its rights, when a quicker and less expensive administrative hearing
might well have produced a mutually satisfactory result. In contrast, the ap-
proach that requires an intruding government to submit to the zoning authori-
ty results in a relatively inexpensive and expeditious administrative pro-
ceeding. The initial decision is made on the basis of a fully developed record
addressing all the interests asserted by each party. A zoning board hearing is
also more likely to result in a compromise, since the parties are not necessarily
hostile adversaries at that stage. At the hearing stage, their relationship may be
more closely akin to that of a petitioner and a judge than that of two opposing
parties. Finally, the public nature of the zoning board hearing ensures that all
public interests are presented to the decisionmaking party and subsequently to
the court. A trial setting is inappropriate for the presentation of public opinion
and commentary, yet it would be the only recourse if the intruding government
were free to make the initial land-use decision. These elements of ad-
ministrative review all support a rule that would prohibit an assertion of im-
munity.
Nevertheless, a requirement that the intruding unit always apply to the
zoning board for a variance, special exception, or non-conforming-use permit,
may diminish the public benefit in some circumstances. First, the zoning
board's review may be duplicative. Where a proposed development has been
scrutinized by a state environmental protection board, 2 " for example, an ad-
ministrative forum with its attendant advantages has been provided. If the fac-
tors examined by an environmental board parallel the factors that would be ex-
amined by a zoning board, 214 there is no reason to require a further application
212
	
N.W.2d at 698-99.
7" An environmental protection board is not the only administrative board that con-
siders questions analogous to those addressed by a local zoning board. A state health agency or
department of transportation might also be included in this category. The essential requirements
are that the reviewing board be independent of the government entity proposing the development
and that the board provide an opportunity for public commentary and criticism.
214 In Illinois, for example, the state environmental protection act provides that regula-
tions relating to air, water, and noise pollution are to be promulgated by the Pollution Control
Board, which is required to: "take into account the existing physical conditions, the character of
the area involved, including the character of surrounding land uses, [and] zoning
classifications. . ." ILL. ANN. STATS. ch . 111-1/2 S 1027(a) (1979 Supp.). A governmental unit
that complies with regulations promulgated under this act is not required to comply with the local
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to the zoning board. There is often sufficient overlap between environmental
issues and zoning issues such that compliance with the former requirements
will ensure protection of the interests advanced by zoning ordinances. 215 In ad-
dition, the establishment by the state legislature of an environmental ad-
ministrative forum may indicate a legislative intent to immunize public
developments from zoning ordinances. The strength of the inference of
legislative intent will vary according to the degree to which the issues addressed
by each administrative board overlap, but the court should entertain the argu-
ment. Compliance with strict environmental regulations is prima facie
evidence that any initial decision by the intruding government will not be
wholly unreasonable; therefore, immunity is not likely to lead to harsh results.
A second factor that militates against an absolute requirement that the in-
truding government initially approach the zoning board is the potential for ex-
cessive and unreasonable delay. For example, if an agency charged with
traversing the state with a highway or pipeline were required to comply with all
zoning ordinances along the route, the project might become so encumbered
with administrative delays that its completion would be .
 jeopardized. Thus, in a
case involving a state agency seeking to develop a project which impacts on
many localities throughout the state, the intruding government should have the
authority to make the initial land-use decisions and the burden of any challenge
should lie with the host units along the route.
Third, courts should weigh the intruding entity's expertise in making site
selection decisions and the importance of location in the achievement of the
project's objectives. In a situation where the specific site is crucial to the
achievement of the project's objectives, the zoning board's decision, though
entirely reasonable, should not automatically prevail. For example, a state
agency charged with assisting ex-convicts to readjust to society has far greater
expertise in the process of selecting a site for a suitable community group home
than does the zoning board. 2 ' 6
 Moreover, the choice of location is crucial to the
rehabilitation process. 21
 In contrast, an intruding municipality seeking to
zoning ordinances of a non-home rule political subdivision. O'Connor v. City of Rockford, 52
111. 2d 360, 367, 288 N.E.2d 432, 436 (1972).
213
	 Town of Oronoco v. City of Rochester, 293 Minn. 468, 472, 197 N.W.2d 426,
429 (1972). The court granted immunity to a city proposing a solid waste disposal system in an
adjacent township. The court, in balancing the interests of the parties, stated:
raPthough an alleged threat of pollution involves a public-interest consideration of
the highest order, in the present matter we arc satisfied that the approval of the
Pollution Control Agency already granted, coupled with the duty and attendant
ample opportunity of that agency to regulate in the future the operation of the
landfill, adequately diipel any fear that development of the Oronoco site would not
be in the public interest for reasons of environmental hazard.
Id.
216 In City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 468 Pa. 174, 360 A.2d 607 (1976), the
dissenting justice observed that "[z]oning boards have no expertise in determining locations
which will aid in the rehabilitation process [of women convicts], particularly at such a crucial
stage as readjustment to a free environment. Such determinations are within the expertise of the
Bureau [of Corrections]." Id. at 190, 360 A.2d at 615 (dissenting opinion).
21? Id.
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establish a landfill in an adjacent county has no greater expertise in selecting
the location than that of the host government. The exact location of a landfill,
moreover, is not usually crucial to its success as a refuse depository. The dif-
ference between these two situations is relevant to the issue of which party
should have the authority to make the initial land-use decision and which party
should bear the burden of a challenge. Hence, where the intruding government
claims greater expertise with regard to the particular land-use decision at issue,
and where site selection is crucial to the successful achievement of the project's
objective, the intruding government should be permitted to present the issue to
the court in a claim for immunity.
Finally, an assertion of immunity should be allowed in order to ensure
consideration of statewide concerns. Otherwise, a concerted effort in com-
munities throughout a state to entirely exclude undesirable facilities might be
successful. Many state facilities, such as state prisons, are necessary and yet
highly objectionable. It may be difficult to get the approval of any host govern-
ment for an undesirable project. If the jurisdiction does not permit an assertion
of immunity, the intruding government's only recourse would be to claim that
each local board's decision was unreasonable. The court then would decide
only whether the public interests favoring the proposed use outweigh those
mitigating against allowing the project in violation of local zoning ordinances.
Under such an ad hoc balancing test, the state agency may have difficulty
showing the need for a particular site when the remainder of the state may be
equally suitable. A broader perspective, therefore, is needed to assess the
merits of undesirable projects of statewide importance. Courts should weigh
such statewide ramifications in the context of a claim of immunity.
In order to ensure review of the above considerations, courts must be will-
ing to review a claim of immunity as well as a claim of unreasonableness.
Nevertheless, because of the inherent advantages of a zoning board's review
proceedings, there should be a strong presumption against immunity. The in-
truding government should be required to submit to the authority of the zoning
board in all cases except where one or more of the above features are present. If
the criteria are applied with consistency, governmental entities proposing
developments can proceed with certainty as to the issues that are to be con-
sidered at trial, and as to the likelihood that immunity will be granted.
In addition to limiting the situations in which immunity is conferred,
courts should not focus primarily on immunity at trial. Rather than stressing
the question of which government unit should have the right to make the initial
land-use decision, the courts should emphasize the issue of which land-use
decision maximizes the benefit to the public. A decision comparing the public
interests sought to be effectuated by the specific land-use proposals is more like-
ly to result in an equitable solution than is a decision comparing the statutory
authority of each adversary. This greater likelihood of an equitable solution
results from the close nexus existing between the practical effects of the com-
peting land-use decisions and the degree of public benefit which is achieved.
No such nexus exists between the powers possessed by each of the government
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units and the degree of public benefit. The issue of immunity is thus only in-
directly related to the issue whether the intruding government's land-use pro-
posal will enhance the public welfare.
The Rutgers test balances general policy issues in determining
immunity. 218 The legislative intent underlying the enabling acts determines
which government unit has the right to make the initial land-use decision. 219
This aspect of the New Jersey test is inappropriate to a decision on which land
use maximizes the public benefit, since it weighs the general interests that
would be weighed by the legislature rather than the specific interests that
underly the specific land-use proposal. Concededly, the New Jersey test does
address the reasonableness of the intruding government's conduct. This sec-
ond tier of analysis, however, does not ensure that the greater public benefit is
achieved. Rather, it ensures only that local adverse impacts are not disgarded
completely.
The preferable approach is that of Temple Terrace, which focuses primarily
on the public poliCy interests that are sought to be promoted by the parties'
specific land-use proposals."° The reasonableness standard of the Florida test
places an affirmative burden on the intruding government entity to prove that
the public interest is better served by allowing the proposed development than
by prohibiting it. 221 This burden is noticeably different from that imposed in
Rutgers, and guarantees that zoning ordinances will only be invalidated when
the public welfare is enhanced by doing so. The deficiency of the Temple Terrace
approach, however, lies in its failure to entertain an assertion of immunity. For
the reasons discussed above, an intruding government should be permitted to
allege that public policy favors immunity.
The optimal test, therefore, is similar to the Fargo test in that it would com-
bine elements of the Rutgers approach and the Temple Terrace approach. As in
Rutgers, an intruding government should be allowed to assert immunity.
Unlike Rutgers, however, immunity should not be decided on the basis of the
court's speculation relating to legislative intent, unless either government's
enabling act clearly expresses an intent on the immunity issue. Nor should im-
munity be decided as it was in Fargo, by balancing the specific need for the proj-
ect against its adverse local impact. This balancing properly relates to the
reasonableness of the parties' conduct. Instead, immunity should be decided
on the basis of the risk of duplicative or excessively time consuming review, the
relative expertise of the parties in making site selection decisions, and the
statewide ramifications of requiring the intruding government entity to submit
" 6 60 N.J. at 152-53, 285 A.2d at 702.
219 Id.
R20 322 So. 2d at 576, 579.
271 Id. at 579. The Temple Terrace court, since it refused to consider the issue of immunity,
stated that the intruding government must always carry this burden of proof. Id. If, however, a
court does permit an assertion of immunity, this burden should not be immutable. Therefore,
whenever immunity is granted, the intruding government should have the benefit of a presump-
tion of reasonableness, which the host government should be required to overcome.
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to local zoning boards. If the enabling acts offer any clear guidance, they
should be examined, but courts should be wary of inferring a legislative intent
where none is implied.
Once a determination is made on the issue of immunity, the inquiry
should shift to the issue of reasonableness, as set forth in Temple Terrace. Which-
ever party has the authority to make the initial decision, the intruding entity if
it is immune or the host entity if the intruding entity is not immune, should
have the benefit of a presumption of reasonableness. Thus, if immunity was
denied, the intruding government must prove to the court that the public
benefits of the proposed project compel the court to overrule the zoning board's
decision. 222 If, however, immunity was granted, the project should be allowed
to proceed unless the host government can affirmatively prove that the adverse
local impacts outweigh the need for the specific project at the proposed site.
Factors which should be considered include: the need for the specific site rela-
tive to the adverse local impacts of the project, the scope of the intruding gov-
ernment's authority, the social utility of the proposed project, the existence of
alternative sites and methods, and the presence of improper considerations in
the decisionmaking process. It is submitted that the approach set forth above is
characterized by effective judicial guidelines, and yet maintains the flexibility
necessary to an equitable solution to these recurring controversies.
CONCLUSION
The three traditional tests which usually have resulted in immunity from
zoning for an intruding government entity are arbitrary and unrelated to con-
sistent land use. These tests have survived in large part because of their
mechanical ease of application. A better solution is to balance the interests pro-
moted by allowing the proposed use at the selected site against the interests
promoted by enforcing the zoning ordinances. Two distinct questions should
be addressed by a court confronted with this controversy. The first is which
party should have the right to make the initial land-use decision. In most situa-
tions, immunity from zoning procedures is not warranted, and the intruding
government should submit its proposal to local administrative review. Second,
a court should consider whether the exercise of the decisionmaking power con-
ferred on one party or another by a grant or denial of immunity was
222 In a jurisdiction that allows an assertion of immunity, even if immunity is rarely
granted, a certain percentage of cases will reach the courts without passing through the ad-
ministrative forum. If a controversy has reached the court without a zoning board decision, and
immunity is denied, the case should be remanded to the administrative forum. Otherwise the
only effect of a denial of immunity will be to create a presumption that the existing zoning or-
dinance is reasonable. None of the benefits derived from the availability of the administrative
forum will have been provided. Moreover, to permit a judicial decision on reasonableness im-
mediately after a denial of immunity will provide intruding entities an easy method to circumvent
local controls entirely where an agency is certain that the balance lies in favor of the proposed
project.
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reasonable. This issue deserves greater emphasis, and should be resolved by
balancing the public interests promoted by allowing the development to pro-
ceed in the specific proposed location against the interests promoted by enforc-
ing the local zoning ordinances. Finally, cases should be resolved in a manner
which encourages cooperation where it is warranted and ensures protection of
the opposing party's interests where it is not. The two-tiered balancing of in-
terests approach, incorporating these principles, is responsive to the complex
factual variations which comprise the substance of intergovernmental zoning
controversies.
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